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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents a reading of C.S. Lewis’s Till We Have Faces: A Myth Retold in 
light of Mikhail Bakhtin and Paul Ricœur’s analysis of time’s role in transformation. I 
will focus on the narrative dynamics Lewis achieves by incorporating the temporal 
into the fabric of his narrative. This approach to temporality contrasts markedly with 
his source material, Apuleius’ Metamorphoses or the Golden Ass, which ultimately 
appears to transcend time and therefore transformation by novel’s end. I finish my 
analysis by arguing that as Lewis moves from his protagonist, Orual's, initial retelling 
to embracing a more limited version of the myth, instead of the disruptive force it is 
for Apuleius, the temporal becomes a generative force, transforming and renewing 
Lewis’s narrative along the lines of Ricœur’s paradigm of prefiguration, configuration, 
and refiguration.  
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Although Apuleius’ Metamorphoses provides C.S. Lewis with the source 
material for Till We Have Faces, his innovative reworking of the Cupid and 
Psyche myth provides a distinctly different view of the nature and role of time 
and transformation. By the end of Apuleius’ narrative, the goddess Isis 
delivers the book’s central character from the transformations to which 
fortune subjects him. Conversely, for Lewis’s protagonist, contact with the 
divine provides not less but more occasion for transformation. My 
examination of Lewis’s retelling of Cupid and Psyche focuses on this 
difference. Thus, for Apuleius, it is only once the characters of the 
Metamorphoses have transcended time’s iterations altogether that they 
exchange the capricious and fragmented world of experience for the timeless 
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blessedness of divine vision. On the other hand, for Lewis, instead of a fall, 
time and the transformation that comes with it actually undergird the 
opportunity for further semantic innovation. After placing the 
Metamorphoses in a broader theoretical context, I turn to Mikhail Bakhtin’s 
analysis to elucidate the role time and transformation play in Apuleius’ novel. 
This analysis sets the stage for Paul Ricœur’s own examination of 
transformation. In the paper to follow I argue that although previous 
application of Ricœur’s ideas on metaphor to Till We Have Faces provides 
insight into transformation’s role on a more limited scale, applying Ricœur’s 
ideas on time and narrative shows how Lewis’s narrative itself plays an 
integral role in transforming an ancient story into a new and innovative work. 
As the title Metamorphoses suggests, on many levels Apuleius’ ancient 
novel is in constant flux. For example, not only do the main characters’ 
fortunes change from one adventure to the next, Apuleius’ style switches 
registers, displaying both the sensational and the refined. Over the millennia 
this protean nature has led to widely divergent interpretations. A near 
contemporary, Augustine of Hippo, was one of the first critics to give a 
complex and detailed view of Apuleius’ work (see Gaisser 2008: 29). For 
Augustine, the type of transformation Apuleius renders in his Metamorphoses 
is demonic illusion. As he says, demons “if they really do such things as these 
on which this discussion turns, do not create real substances, but only change 
the appearance of things created by the true God so as to make them seem to 
be what they are not” (Augustine 2007: 681). For Augustine, transformation 
as illusion hinges on the notion that Apuleius’ Metamorphoses or the Golden 
Ass as he calls it, to this day the more commonly used title, is understood as 
autobiographical. 
Although Augustine’s reading of the Golden Ass as autobiography 
continued to inform medieval perception of the work (Gaisser 2008: 85), by 
the time of Petrarch the emphasis had shifted from identifying Apuleius’ 
pagan underpinnings to assimilating and reinterpreting it into a Christian 
framework. In one of his letters, Petrarch reinforces an autobiographical 
interpretation of the Golden Ass by comparing his arrival in Paris to Apuleius’ 
arrival in Hypata (in the Golden Ass it is his protagonist, not necessarily 
Apuleius himself, who arrives in Hypata)1. However, illuminations on a 
manuscript transcribed by the Bolognese scribe Bartolomeo de’ Bartoli 
                                                     
1 Petrarch, Familiarum rerum libri (1.4.4). The conflation of Apuleius with his protagonist 
Lucius is an area of considerable debate in contemporary scholarship. For an introduction see 
Kahane and Laird (eds.) (2001). Also see Harrison (2000: 217-220), and Van der Paardt (1981: 96-
106). 
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around the same time as Petrarch’s description visually emphasize an 
increasingly didactic understanding. The opening decoration of the seven 
virtues on de’ Bartoli’s manuscript sets the tone for the illuminations found 
throughout the rest of his transcription2. Also around the time of Petrarch, 
Boccaccio’s Genealogie reworks Apuleius’ Cupid and Psyche myth into a 
Christian account of redemption (see Gaisser 2008: 118). Psyche and her 
sisters are no longer separate characters but faculties of the soul, and most 
tellingly Psyche is not made immortal by the gods at the end of the story but is 
immortal throughout, since according to medieval Christian orthodoxy the 
soul is by definition immortal.  
As scholarship became increasingly secular, interest in the Golden Ass 
became less overtly religious. In the Victorian era, Walter Pater’s Marius the 
Epicurean portrays a fascination with the work based on its aesthetic merits. 
By viewing the Metamorphosis outside of a religious or didactic framework, 
Pater frees himself from attempting an appraisal of the work as a whole. 
Instead he focuses on the episode of Cupid and Psyche as a “gem” amid the 
“mockeries” and “burlesque horrors” of the main narrative. For Pater, the tale 
of Cupid and Psyche is “full of brilliant, life-like situations, speciosa locis, and 
abounding in lovely visible imagery (one seemed to see and handle the golden 
hair, the fresh flowers, the precious works of art in it!)” (Pater 1921: 61). For a 
reader wanting a larger meaning beyond the story’s artistry, Pater says that a 
“gentle idealism,” which he sees permeating the Cupid and Psyche episode, 
allows the reader to “take it, if you chose, for an allegory” (Pater 1921: 61).  
These historical approaches adumbrate much of contemporary 
scholarship on the The Golden Ass. Although he reaches an entirely different 
conclusion, Harrison, for example, follows Augustine’s lead insofar as he 
places the Golden Ass in a biographical context (see Harrison 2004: especially 
pages 210-59). On the contrary, taking his cue from Walter Pater, Kenny sees 
not Apuleius’ life but the figures of Cupid and Psyche as key to understanding 
the narrative. Like Pater, Kenny reads the episode as allegory. However, he 
does not appear to pick up on Pater’s implicit dismissal of the rest of the 
narrative as characterized by mockery and “burlesque horror,” preferring 
instead to view the entire novel as illuminated by the Platonic idealism he sees 
emanating from Cupid and Psyche (see Kenny 1990: 12-38). Additionally, a 
view of the book as animated by moral and religious concerns finds 
contemporary voice in the work of scholars like Tatum. In his article “The 
Tales of Apuleius”, Tatum argues that episodes in Apuleius’ narrative 
                                                     
2 This manuscript can be found in the Vatican Library (Vat. lat. 2194).  
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represent “an easily perceivable progression in human degradation” (Tatum 
1969: 522). For Tatum the work’s main concern is moral and didactic.  
Mikhail Bakhtin’s critical work on the Golden Ass provides incisive 
comprehension of the issues discussed so far and refocuses the analysis back 
onto the nature and role of transformation. Central to Bakhtin’s examination 
is his notion of time, which he labels as chronotope, and defines as “the 
intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are 
artistically expressed in literature” (Bakhtin 2006: 84). For Bakhtin, different 
historical eras have different chronotopes that characterize each era’s ability 
to artistically represent the world. The chronotope of adventure-time in 
classical Greek Romance provides the background for his discussion of 
transformation in the Golden Ass. Distinguished by the central role chance 
plays, adventure-time renders events in a narrative as a discrete, disconnected 
series. In such a configuration, although metamorphosis predominates, all the 
changes characters undergo throughout the course of a narrative leave them 
fundamentally unchanged. Key to the chronotope of adventure-time is its 
abstract nature and geographical extension. Once a work becomes grounded 
in a particular time and place, it becomes subject to a milieu that begins to 
determine its progression, limiting the scope for possible adventure but also 
opening the door to processes that convert random change into sequences of 
events that result in transformation.  
By inserting characters into a semblance of the biographical time of 
everyday life, Apuleius creates the opportunity for distinct personality and 
moral choice. In so doing he introduces an initiating force. Thus, although 
Fotis accidently changes Lucius into an ass instead of a bird, and accidently 
the roses needed to reverse the change are not in the house, just as it is an 
accident that robbers happen to appear at that very moment to kidnap Lucius, 
it is not accident but Lucius’ curiosity that sets these events in motion. As 
Bakhtin observes this whole sequence of events “is not chance but 
voluptuousness, youthful frivolity and ‘prurient curiosity’ that urged Lucius 
on… He himself is guilty. He undoes the game of chance by his own prurience. 
The primary initiative, therefore, belongs to the hero himself and to his own 
personality” (Bakhtin 2006: 116). By interspersing adventure-time with that 
of everyday life a new type of adventure-time emerges. “It is not the time of a 
Greek romance, a time that leaves no traces. On the contrary, it leaves a deep 
and eradicable mark on the man himself as well as on his entire life” (Bakhtin 
2006: 116). However, although Lucius’ choice initiates a sequence of events 
that in the end transforms him, the continued bifurcation between the time of 
everyday life and the time of adventure renders events as entirely external to 
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characters. Lucius’ transformation into an ass affects the content of what he 
sees but not how he sees.  
Bakhtin identifies the pattern this second type of adventure-time gives 
rise to as that of guilt  punishment  redemption  purification 
blessedness. It is a pattern the various episodes of the Golden Ass mirror 
throughout. For example, in the Cupid and Psyche novella one finds Psyche’s 
transgression of her husband’s wishes also initiating a sequence of events 
culminating in her reception into the blessed company of the gods3. However 
in the Golden Ass, adventure-time and everyday-time never fully synthesize 
into a unified whole. As a result “the separate episodes […] are rounded-off 
and complete, but at the same time are isolated and self-sufficient” (Bakhtin 
2006: 128). Consequently, the “everyday world is scattered, fragmented, 
deprived of essential connections. It is not permeated with a single temporal 
sequence which has its own specific systematization and ineluctability” 
(Bakhtin 2006: 128). Apuleius concludes the Golden Ass with the goddess Isis 
informing his protagonist of the final sequence of events leading to 
redemption. By following her directions and casting off his asinine form, 
Lucius at last exits both adventure-time and the time of everyday life. 
Ultimately, it is only as Lucius transcends not just adventure-time and 
everyday-time but all of time’s iterations that he attains a vantage point that 
allows him to look back at the whole of his experience. His final 
transformation from ass to devotee of the goddess culminates in front of a 
divine image that affords him a completely integrated and timeless vision4. In 
                                                     
3 In book 5 of the Golden Ass, Psyche’s guilt takes the shape of listening to her jealous sisters 
and spying on her sleeping husband against his wishes (Apuleius 1994: 83-93). Book 6 treats Venus’ 
punishment of Psyche with different difficult tasks she must accomplish. For example, she must 
sort a huge pile of different kinds of seeds (Apuleius 1994: 105). For each punishment Psyche is 
redeemed by different characters. In the seed punishment for example, ants come to her rescue. 
However, it is Cupid who must ultimately redeem Psyche and bring her into the blessed company of 
the gods by marrying her (Apuleius 1994: 113). Before doing so, however, Psyche must be purified. 
Her last guilty act is to look inside Proserpine’s box of beauty, which puts her into a very deep sleep, 
from which Cupid arouses her with a gentle prick from his arrow (Apuleius 1994: 111-112). 
4 Apuleius of Madauros’ The Metamorphoses (11.24-25): “Provolutus denique ante 
conspectum deae et facie mea diu detersis vestigiis eius, lacrimis obortis, singultu crebro sermonem 
interficiens et verba devorans, aio: ‘Tu quidem sancta et humani generis sospitatrix perpetua, 
semper fovendis mortalibus munifica, dulcem matris affectionem miserorum casibus tribuis. Nec 
dies nec quies ulla ac ne momentum quidem tenue tuis transcurrit beneficiis otiosum, quin mari 
terraque protegas homines et deplusis vitae procellis salutarem porrigas desteram, qua fatorum 
etiam inextricabiliter contorta retractas licia, et Fortune tempestates mitigas, et stellarum nosio 
meatus cohibes. Te superi colunt, observant inferi, tu rotas orbem, luminas solem, regis mundum, 
calcas Tartarum. Tibi respondent sidera, redeunt tempora, gaudent numina, serviunt elementa: tuo 
nutu spirant flamina, nutrient nubile, germinant semina, crescunt germina. Tuam maiestatem 
 
Matthew Lukens  
The Refiguration of Body and Soul: Time and Narrative 
in C.S. Lewis’s Retelling of the Cupid and Psyche Myth 
 
 Amaltea. Revista de mitocrítica 
Vol. 4 (2012) | pp. 115‐129 
 
 
120 
 
the Golden Ass it is from this divinely whole and unchanging vantage point 
that meaning and vision flow.  
Rather than the completely integrated and timeless vision Apuleius 
concludes his own work with, C.S. Lewis’s letter to Clyde Kilby (see Lewis 
1993: 462) suggests he had something much more dynamic in mind with Till 
We Have Faces. Orual, for example, should not be viewed as a symbol but as a 
“case” of human affection become tyrannical. Similarly, although Glome’s 
religious changes are analogous to the transition between Christianity and 
Modernism, this comparison should only be understood as a parallel and not 
as allegorical. Furthermore, in an addendum to Till We Have Faces he 
explains that Apuleius rendering of the Cupid and Psyche episode serves as a 
source not as a model or even an influence. The perspective these comments 
suggest about the vision of the world Lewis projects in Till We Have Faces can 
be more clearly expressed in the distinction he draws elsewhere between 
looking at something and looking along it. Thus,  
A young man meets a girl. The whole world looks different when he sees her 
[…] Now comes a scientist and describes this young man’s experience from 
the outside. For him it is all an affair of the young man’s genes and a 
recognised biological stimulus. That is the difference between looking along 
the sexual impulse and looking at it (Lewis 1970: 212).  
As Lewis goes on to say, “one must look both along and at everything” 
(Lewis 1970: 215). In contrast to the all encompassing divine vision Apuleius 
gives his protagonist at the end of the Golden Ass, for Lewis, it is this dynamic 
interaction between perspectives that transforms vision and provides the 
grounds for meaning.  
In describing the notion that the dynamic interaction between 
perspectives strengthens rather than diminishes vision Lewis does not 
advance beyond analogy and anecdote. To find a more rigorous treatment of 
the concept and how it applies to Till We Have Faces, I now turn to the work 
of Ricœur. An outline of not only how Ricœur’s work on transformation 
functions, but also how those ideas apply to Till We Have Faces, can be found 
                                                                                                                                                 
perhorrescunt aves caelo meantes, ferae montibus errantes, serpents solo latentes, beluae ponto 
natantes. At ego referdis laudibus tuis exilis ingenio et adhibendis sacrificiis tenuis patrimonio; nec 
mihi vocis ubertas ad dicenda quae de tua maiestate sentio sufficit, nec ora mille lingueque totidem 
vel indefessi sermonis aeterna series. Ergo quod solum potest, religiosus quidem sed pauper 
alioquin, efficere curabo: divinos tuos vultus numenque sanctissimum intra pectoris mei secreta 
condtum perpetuo custodiens imaginabor’”.  
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in the work of Donaldson5. In her book Holy Places are Dark Places, 
Donaldson examines how Ricœur’s logic of metaphor illuminates an 
understanding of Lewis’s protagonist. According to Donaldson the key to this 
understanding can be found in what she holds to be the two central 
metaphors of the book: “holy places are dark places” and “you too shall be 
Psyche”. For Donaldson, interpreting these two statements from within 
Ricœur’s metaphorical framework allows for an interpretation of 
transformation as essentially meaningful rather than “a course either of 
random occurrences or of events whose meaning is to be derived from the 
sequence of their occurrence” (Donaldson 1988: 63). According to Donaldson, 
Ricœur’s “metaphorical logic” that accounts for the transformations in Till We 
Have Faces follows the form of a literal perception of a statement followed by 
a recognition of the inadequacy of the literal interpretation, which ultimately 
gives way to transformed understanding. For example, the god’s statement to 
Orual that she also will be Psyche seems to be an assertion of literal identity at 
first; however, as the story progresses and Orual does not encounter the literal 
obstacles facing Psyche, like exile, to remain meaningful the statement must 
be reinterpreted. In a sense, for Donaldson, the project of Lewis’s entire book 
can be seen as the working out of this process of reinterpretation. By the end 
of the story Orual comes to actually see herself as Psyche in a vision. “Two 
figures, reflections, their feet to Psyche’s feet and mine, stood head downward 
in the water. But whose were they? Two Psyches, the one clothed, the other 
naked? Yes, both Psyches, both beautiful […] beyond all imagining, yet not 
exactly the same” (Lewis 1956: 307-308). For Orual, this scene is the 
culmination of her quest to be reconciled with her sister. On a more abstract 
level it also culminates an account of transformation where a literal 
understanding of a statement becomes recognized as obviously untrue but 
which subsequently gives way to reinterpretation, the literal identification 
becoming a relationship of similarity. In other words, as Orual begins “looking 
along” the statement that she “also shall be Psyche” instead of simply “at it,” 
she gains a refreshed understanding of the divine as well as of herself. 
Perceptive as Donaldson’s application of metaphorical logic to Till We Have 
Faces is, however, her analysis of Lewis’s entire book hinges on two 
statements. To gain a broader understanding of the nature and role of 
transformation I now turn to Ricœur’s analysis of time in his three-volume 
                                                     
5 Mara Donaldson’s book Holy Places are Dark Places: C. S. Lewis and Paul Ricœur on 
Narrative Transformation (1988) is the only substantial study to date connecting Till We Have 
Faces with Paul Ricœur’s thought; also see Alison Searle (2007: 225), which takes a very similar 
approach to the one Donaldson takes.  
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examination of time and narrative. I do so in order to show how Lewis’s 
narrative itself plays an integral role in transforming an ancient story into 
something new.  
By Ricœur’s own account, his work on time and narrative grew naturally 
out of his work with metaphor. As he says in his introduction to his three 
volume series Time and Narrative, the projects form a pair: 
Although metaphor has traditionally belonged to the theory of ‘tropes’ (or 
figures of discourse) and narrative to the theory of literary ‘genres’, the 
meaning-effects produced by each of them belong to the same basic 
phenomenon of semantic innovation (Ricœur 1985, I: ix).  
The key point is that Ricœur’s work on metaphor and on time and 
narrative both center on how transformation leads to innovation in meaning. 
For Ricœur, the three part – is, is not, is like – process of metaphorical 
transformation find their counterpart in what Ricœur calls Mimesis , 
Mimesis 2, and Mimesis 3. Ricœur uses mimesis in the Aristotelian sense to 
refer to the imitation of actions which when taken as a whole form a plot. This 
part forms the semantic part of his investigation, how actions mean 
something. Aristotle thus forms one side of the argument, however, Ricœur is 
interested in not only semantics but also innovation. To inform the innovative 
side of his argument, Ricœur appeals to Augustine’s treatise on time where 
the past, present, and future, in order to be intelligible, must be understood in 
terms of each other. In other words, in order for the present to be understood 
as the present it must be seen in terms of both the past and future. To 
illustrate, Ricœur summarizes Augustine’s argument explained in terms of a 
resonating sound. “The function of the three celebrated examples of a sound 
that is resonating, a sound that has resonated, and two sounds that resonate 
one after the other, is to make this tearing apart appear as that of the 
threefold present” (1985, I: 16). The notion of a tearing apart that results in 
the synthesis of a threefold present is fundamental to understanding what 
Ricœur means by Mimesis 1, Mimesis 2, and Mimesis 3 and consequently his 
project of providing an account of semantic innovation in terms of time and 
narrative. To put the two halves of Ricœur’s argument together, then, by 
combining Aristotle’s idea of synthesis of an action in plot and Augustine’s 
idea of the passage of time tearing unity into multiplicity, Ricœur brings what 
he calls the concordant and discordant parts of his argument to bear on the 
question of semantic innovation. For it is in the crucible of time’s tearing 
unity into multiplicity and narrative’s synthesis of multiplicity into unity that 
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Ricœur sees semantic innovation and as a consequence transformation in 
meaning as occurring6.  
Ricœur’s analysis provides a framework for understanding how both the 
discordant and concordant elements of time and narrative affect Lewis’s 
treatment of transformation in Till We Have Faces. In the first part of his 
novel, Lewis’s protagonist provides her own configuration (instead of 
mimesis, Ricœur mostly uses the terms prefiguration, configuration, and 
refiguration) to what she views as Apuleius’ inaccurate version of the Cupid 
and Psyche story. Thus, at the end of the first part of Till We Have Faces a 
priest’s recounting of Apuleius’ version spurs Orual to write a more truthful 
account. However, in the second part of the book, as Orual begins to re-
envision, or refigure, her understanding of her own story and of the world she 
finds herself in, Apuleius’ and Lewis’s narratives begin to merge. Like Lucius 
at the conclusion of The Golden Ass, as Orual reflects on the completed whole 
of her narrative she exits a world marked by the passage of time. One day, as 
she enters a garden and opens her book, she walks into a vision that 
unmistakably echoes the same mythical journey to the underworld Psyche 
completes in Apuleius’ version.  
In Orual’s vision, not only is the task she seeks to accomplish similar to 
one of the tasks Aphrodite gives Psyche in the Golden Ass but the passage of 
time also begins to resemble Apuleius’ negation of it. In her vision Orual 
embarks on a journey where intense light from a sun high and directly 
overhead illuminates her path so completely it casts no shadows. As she 
describes it, “I walked in the dry sand up to my ankles, white with sand to my 
middle, my throat rough with sand […] I walked for a hundred years” (Lewis 
1956: 286). Without markers to indicate movement, the passage of the years 
begins to mirror the illuminated but unmoving wholeness of divine vision in 
the Golden Ass.   
However, in contrast to Apuleius’ protagonist, for Orual it is precisely the 
wholeness and transcendence of her vision that traps her. After walking one 
hundred years, the huge mountains Orual encounters at the conclusion of her 
journey represent an insurmountable obstacle. Moreover, in place of the 
divine blessedness of Apuleius’ final vision, the cliffs of the mountains that 
detain her are rotten and swarming with scorpions and snakes. As the 
discordant passage of time increasingly fades so too does the possibility of 
transformation and innovation. Without the multiplicity of possibilities the 
passage of time brings to a narrative, Orual’s vision stalls. Left to itself the 
                                                     
6 See Ricœur (1985, I: 1-27) 
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concordant power of her narrative grows stronger and her refigured vision of 
the world turns in on itself. Rather than ascending the mountains into divine 
vision, with her written work in place of Psyche’s mythical bowl, shadowy 
figures seize and carry her into a cave at the base of the mountains. Instead of 
transcendence, Orual is forced down and in. Moreover, instead of a unified, 
divine vision where all is clear, Orual finds herself transported into a 
courtroom, containing the shades of everyone from not only her past but, it 
appears, from the span of Glome’s history. When finally brought before a 
judge to read her complaint, hands strip her clothes from her, leaving her 
body bare for all to see. Sheltered from direct sunlight overhead, the cave’s 
gray light reveals the effects of her hundred-year journey. The brilliance of 
immortal vision in Apuleius’ myth and the earth’s inchoate but enduring 
strength in Orual’s counter narrative strikingly converge in the cave’s dim 
light, revealing the shriveled breasts and shrunken limbs of an all-too-human 
queen.  
Thus, Orual’s light-drenched journey culminates not in the heavens or the 
earth but in the deadlands. Moreover, instead of a bowl for the water of death 
that Psyche uses to achieve release from the confines of the every-day, 
physical world of experience Orual must read her complaint aloud. However, 
as she looks at her book to begin reading, she discovers that the journey in her 
vision has devoured not only body, but book as well: “I looked at the scroll in 
my hand and saw at once that it was not the book I had written. It couldn’t be; 
it was far too small. And too old – a little shabby, crumpled thing” (Lewis 
1956: 289). Consequently, she determines not to obey the judge commanding 
her to read, but then finds herself voicing the words anyway. As she reads, it 
becomes clear that the words themselves, like the light outside the cave, 
illuminate by devouring. As Orual looks at the shape of the words, distinctions 
begin to dissolve. As such, it becomes impossible to tell what is real and what 
is only image. Similarly, essential differences between divine and human, 
temporal and eternal, father and daughter, begin to dissolve in the cave’s gray 
light. Moreover, without her realizing it, as Orual comes to the end of her 
account she immediately begins reading her narrative again from the 
beginning. As Orual’s narrative turns in on itself, the circularity of everyday 
time begins to resemble the increasingly still and timeless vision that 
characterizes the conclusion of both Psyche and Lucius’ journeys in the 
Golden Ass but on a smaller and smaller scale.  
Lewis, however, does not leave his protagonist’s vision stalled. In the 
midst of her interminable reading, the god presiding over the cave’s 
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courtroom scene interrupts Orual who finally recognizes the diminished state 
of her narrative7. The pictures Orual encounters as she exits the cave in the 
company of her childhood tutor illustrate how when placed in time her vision 
recalls its transformative and innovative power. Key to this innovative process 
is conceiving of textual configuration as mediating between prefiguration and 
refiguration. As Ricœur explains, the hermeneutical arc “is the concrete 
process by which the textual configuration mediates between the 
prefiguration of the practical field and its refiguration through the reception 
of the work” (Ricœur 1985, I: 53). Orual’s statement at the beginning of part 
two of Till We Have Faces that she has gained new insight into her life 
through the writing of part one suggests that when placed in the context of 
time, her written text performs just the type of mediating role Ricœur ascribes 
to the role of configuration in Time and Narrative.  
The paintings Orual encounters as she exits the cave where her trial 
occured, depict the completion of Psyche’s mythical journey to the 
underworld to obtain a casket of beauty for Venus, who Orual now recognizes 
as herself. They also summarize part one of her book. Moreover, instead of the 
meaningless repetitions that characterize Orual’s reading of the book in her 
cave, the pictures Orual sees make both the task and part one of her story 
come alive:  
Now we were before it and I could see the story it told. I saw a woman 
coming to the river bank. I mean that by her painted posture I could see it 
was a picture of one walking. That at first. But no sooner had I understood 
this than it became alive, and the ripples of the water were moving and the 
reeds stirred with the water and the grass stirred with the breeze, and the 
woman moved on and came to the river’s edge (Lewis 1956: 298).  
That Lewis uses moving but two-dimensional pictures at the end of part 
two of Till We Have Faces to replace the three-dimensional but unmoving 
statue Lucius contemplates at the end of The Golden Ass suggests a more 
limited but more dynamic view of art. That is, by reducing the final part of 
Orual’s vision from Lucius’ divine and all-encompassing vision of eternity to a 
more limited, temporally bound image, Lewis breaks the absolute but 
                                                     
7 Aspects of Lewis’s cave scene resonate with Plato’s: see The Republic (517b ss). For both Plato 
and for Lewis, a cave provides the setting for increased enlightenment. The significant difference, 
however, is that for Plato enlightenment comes by exiting the cave and embracing a vision of eternal 
forms, whereas for Lewis enlightenment comes, and Orual exits the cave, only after recognizing her 
own role in her increasingly diminished story. Plato’s rendering of the cave depicts knowledge as a 
vision of external forms; Lewis’s rendering depicts Orual’s knowledge as derived from the dynamic 
interaction between internal and external. 
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unmoving surface of the myth. The plot’s grasping together of disparate 
elements into a unified whole does not get stuck in a ceaseless cycle of 
repetition that comes to mirror a static vision of eternity. Instead, Lewis’s 
temporally bound configuration of events mediate between prefiguration and 
refiguration, as each incomplete image gives way to successive images that 
deepen and enrich the story. In combining both picture and movement, the 
synchronic and the diachronic, Lewis brings an Aristotelian concept of plot 
and an Augustinian notion of time into contact. The result of this 
juxtaposition is innovation in meaning. 
The remainder of the paintings depicts what Orual at first thinks is herself 
attempting to commit suicide through drowning. As she looks more closely, 
however, she realizes that the events unfolding are not happening to her but 
to Psyche: “She was tying her ankles together with her girdle. I looked closer 
at her. She was not I. She was Psyche” (Lewis 1956: 298). As Orual continues 
to follow the paintings, since her own narrative prefigures the events she sees 
depicted, in a sense they represent her own experience as well. Even more 
deeply, they represent the events depicted in Apuleius’ myth. However, as 
Orual receives the paintings and reacts to them, the time of the events 
depicted in Orual’s narrative and Apuleius’ myth distends and contracts. As it 
does so, the disparate paintings link into a narrative that refigures both 
accounts. In the frame that portrays the beginning of Orual’s journey across 
the desert, she recognizes herself for the first time, but as a shadow: “In the 
next picture I saw both Psyche and myself, but I was only a shadow. We toiled 
together over those burning sands, she with her empty bowl, I with the book 
full of my poison. She did not see me” (Lewis 1956: 300). When both finally 
arrive at the mountain, Orual disappears into her cave, but Psyche, in the 
bowl she has been carrying, receives the water of death from the eagle. The 
paintings that follow depict Psyche completing her final task of carrying a 
casket to retrieve beauty from the deadlands. However, as she journeys 
towards the completion of her task, rather than past Apuleius’ mythical 
landmarks, Psyche progresses deeper and deeper into the events of Orual’s 
written narrative. Moreover, as Orual receives these paintings portraying her 
sister’s journey, her understanding of the role she played in them refigures 
her conception of her own identity. 
As Psyche travels deeper not only into the completion of her task but also 
into Orual’s own story, the final refiguration of her narrative and Apuleius’ 
myth occurs in neither the eternal time of myth nor in a narrated time of the 
past or future, but in the lived time of the present. As live, sweet voices 
summon Orual from the antechamber she has been viewing the paintings in, 
she exits into the brightly colored, illuminated world. Once outside, she finds 
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herself being led to a court with a pool in its center where Orual finally 
reunites with Psyche. Lewis describes the scene where Orual reunites with 
Psyche as she returns from the underworld with her casket of beauty: 
The air that came from her clothes and limbs and hair was wild and sweet... 
And yet (it is hard to say) with all this, even because of all this, she was the 
old Psyche still; a thousand times more her very self than she had been 
before the Offering. For all that had then but flashed out in a glance or a 
gesture, all that one meant most when one spoke her name, was now wholly 
present, not to be gathered up from hints nor in shreds, not some of it in one 
moment and some in another. Goddess? I had never seen a real woman 
before (Lewis 1956: 306).  
Thus, at the end of Till We Have Faces, the scattered fragments of the 
story resolve for Orual, not in the final vision of an immobile statue (as they 
did for Lucius at the end of The Golden Ass), but in an encounter with a live 
woman. What is more, in this courtroom, as the judge enters to pass sentence, 
Orual feels herself literally becoming refigured: “Each breath I drew let into 
me new terror, joy, overpowering sweetness. I was pierced through with the 
arrows of it. I was being unmade” (Lewis 1956: 307). The results of this event 
do not prompt Orual to bid her reader goodbye (as does Lucius after the 
transformation he undergoes in the temple of his goddess). Instead, it 
prompts her to further revelation. As the judge approaches and Orual looks 
down into the pool of water at her feet, she sees not one, but two images of 
Psyche reflected.  
Two figures, reflections, their feet to Psyche’s feet and mine, stood head 
downward in the water. But whose were they? Two Psyches, the one clothed, 
the other naked? Yes, both Psyches, both beautiful (if that mattered now) 
beyond all imagining, yet not exactly the same (Lewis 1956: 308).  
As the god passes judgment with the words, “You also are Psyche”, the 
pronouncement wakes Orual from her vision, and she finds herself back in the 
palace gardens with her book in her hand. 
Orual’s final vision presents, in miniature, the working of Till We Have 
Faces as a whole. In the frame narrative, Orual’s last vision precedes her final 
attempts to revise her book. She dies in midsentence with the words “I 
might—”. In an addendum, the head priest of Glome’s religious cult, Arnom, 
explains that Orual wanted her book taken to Greece where it could be read 
and discussed. He adds, “This book was all written by Queen Orual of Glome, 
who was the most wise, just, valiant, fortunate and merciful of all the princes 
known in our parts of the world” (Lewis 1956: 308-309). Thus, when taken as 
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a whole, Apuleius’ prefiguration of Orual as Psyche’s jealous sister becomes 
configured during the course of Orual’s storytelling and finally culminates in 
the refiguration of Arnom’s statement about Orual as the best Queen in his 
part of the world. 
By the end of Till We Have Faces, not only has the character of the jealous 
sister become refigured in the person of Orual, but so has time’s role in the 
unfolding of a narrative. In the Golden Ass, to achieve the eternal, Psyche 
must leave the temporal behind. Similarly, in Apuleius’ frame narrative, 
Lucius only transcends to the divine as he cuts his connections to a world 
characterized by the divergent movement of time. In contrast, in his retelling 
of the Cupid and Psyche story, Lewis incorporates the passage of time into the 
ever changing and expanding fabric of the Cupid and Psyche narrative itself, 
thereby transforming not only its prefigured paradigms, but also its 
configured structure. In the vision that results, rather than devouring 
meaning, the passage of time transforms and refigures, opening up still and 
timeless narratives to the possibility of new and dynamic horizons.  
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